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Territoriality, Jurisdiction, and the Right(s) of Publicity 
David G. Post* 
When Professors Rothman and Ginsburg asked me to speak here on the issues 
surrounding territoriality, jurisdiction, choice of law, and the like in the law of 
publicity, I confessed that I knew little about the developing law of publicity rights.  
Having taught Copyright Law for many years, I had come across the well-known 
foundational publicity rights cases—the cases involving Tom Waits,1 Vanna White,2 
and Bette Midler3—because of the problematic relationship between those decisions 
(under California state law) and federal copyright law.  But I had not studied the 
publicity doctrine, or the main corpus of cases and statutes, with any great care.   
I had, however, done some thinking over the years about territoriality and 
jurisdiction in other contexts.4  I was happy to have the opportunity to dive in and 
spend a couple of months immersing myself in the publicity cases and commentary 
to try to discover how those questions played themselves out in this particular corner 
of the legal universe.  I found the results “alarming.”  I use the term advisedly, so let 
me try to explain what I mean by it. 
I recently purchased this coffee mug from a woman—we will call her “Ms. Seller” 
—operating a small souvenir cart on Flatbush Avenue in Brooklyn: 
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Figure 1.  Photograph taken by author.  
 
Suppose Ms. Seller were to ask us:  “What are my legal obligations regarding the use 
of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s likeness,5 and the text referencing his life and work, on 
the mug?  What, if anything, must I do, and whose permission, if anyone’s, do I need, 
in order to comply with those legal obligations?”6   
 How do we, as lawyers, begin to answer her questions?  
Knowing that these “publicity rights” questions are governed almost entirely by 
state law, we can be sure that the answers to Ms. Seller’s questions will be 
complicated, confusing, and uncertain.  Complexity, confusion, and uncertainty are 
inherent and inevitable consequences of attempting to apply fifty separate sets of 
state laws, embedded within a federal system, to events and transactions and people 
and goods and information that are whizzing constantly across state borders—to say 
nothing of any possible international complications.  It will not alarm me to find 
complexity and uncertainty in this particular corner of the legal universe, because I 
fully expect them to be there.  
But suppose we were to discover a system that can never produce answers to Ms. 
Seller’s questions, a Kafkaesque system in which the rules which apply to one’s 
conduct are completely invisible to, or determinable by, the affected parties ex ante.  
That would surely be alarming, or worse—“appalling.”  In that system, it is 
impossible to conform one’s actions to the law, because one cannot tell in advance 
what the law is.  That system, as Lon Fuller put it a half-century ago, “does not simply 
result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal 
system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can 
still be said to be one kind of contract.”7  The Rule of Law itself, whatever it may 
 
 5. As it happens, using an object that references the life of Dr. King is particularly apt for a 
conference on publicity rights, as it is well-known that the King estate has been quite emphatic in pursuing 
publicity rights claims.  See Geoff Edgers, Why No Major Martin Luther King, Jr. Artifacts Will Be at The 
New African-American Museum, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/R5VH-N28M.  
 6. I will ignore, for purposes of this example and this talk, questions concerning possible copyright 
infringement claims that could arise out of her use of that particular photograph or that particular text. 
 7. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964).  Professor Fuller’s work has unfortunately 
fallen somewhat out of fashion in academic circles these days; I find it to be an especially rich source of 
ideas and clear thinking.  Fuller discussed eight ways that a system of rules can “miscarry,” and cease to 
be something that can be fairly called a legal system:  (1) A “failure to achieve rules at all”; (2) a “failure 
to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe”; (3) 
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encompass and however it may manifest itself, does depend in some most 
fundamental way on our ability, at least some of the time, to answer questions like 
Ms. Seller’s in advance of deciding whether or not to act in a given situation.  
If we could somehow measure the extent of this ex ante uncertainty, we might 
imagine placing entire legal systems, or individual sub-systems such as employment 
law, securities law, banking law, or defamation law, aligned along an Uncertainty 
Axis as follows:  
Figure 2.  A hypothetical axis of legal uncertainty. 
 
“Alarming” lies somewhere between ordinary (complicated, but manageable) on 
the one hand and “appalling and law-less” on the other.  I am not at all sure where 
ordinary becomes alarming, or alarming becomes appalling, but these publicity cases 
certainly made me think more about those questions.  
 A good place to start our inquiry on Ms. Seller’s behalf—given that publicity 
rights questions are governed by state law—is with the “choice of law” question.  
This is a matter of simple logic:  I cannot know whether the law does or does not 
require her to obtain someone’s permission—or, really, whether the law imposes any 
legal obligations on her—until I know:  What law—whose law—do I need to consult 
to  determine the nature and scope of those obligations? 
 
“retroactive legislation”; (4) “a failure to make rules understandable”; (5) “contradictory rules”; (6) “rules 
that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party”; (7) rules subject to “such frequent changes 
. . . that the subject cannot orient his action by them”; and (8) a lack of “congruence between the rules as 
announced and their actual administration.”  Id.  A “total failure in any one of these eight directions,” 
Fuller argues, destroys the moral claim that the system has on its subjects’ obedience: 
Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to 
obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only 
after he had acted, or was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule, or commanded the 
impossible, or changed every minute. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The hypothetical I describe in this piece falls squarely within the second of Fuller’s 
categories (and possibly the fourth as well). 
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Choice of law questions often require a complicated analysis, even for the 
simplest claims.  Choice of law rules are themselves the creature of state law, and 
each state has its own algorithms to determine which body of substantive law applies 
in a given case.  Given a single, common set of operative facts, such as where the 
mugs are manufactured, where Ms. Seller conducts business, where and from whom 
she obtains mugs for resale, where those individuals or entities do business, where 
our seller is domiciled, and where Dr. King was domiciled at the time of his death, 
etc., those algorithms may yield different outcomes, each pointing to a different body 
of substantive law.  
That can be quite a powerful uncertainty-generator, right at the outset of our 
inquiry.  Fortunately, though, for many types of claims, the different states apply 
similar or even identical choice of law rules.  That is, there exists a rough consensus 
among them about the algorithm to be used for determining which law governs any 
specific claim.  In the law of wills and trusts, or real property transactions, or 
conversion, or breach of contract, or tortious assault and battery, states are largely in 
agreement about how the initial choice of law analysis proceeds.  Given a set of 
relevant facts out of which the claim is said to have arisen, they will—more or less—
reach the same or similar conclusion regarding the law applicable to the claim.  If the 
question is whether you had adequately disclosed something in a deed to real 
property located in New York, I am fairly certain New York law will be applied, 
whether a claim of inadequate disclosure is filed against you in New York (and New 
York choice of law rules apply), New Mexico (where New Mexico choice of law 
rules apply) or New Hampshire (where New Hampshire choice of law rules apply).8   
This kind of rough consensus among states, where it exists, is wonderfully 
uncertainty-reducing.  Provided states use roughly the same choice of law algorithm, 
we can predict with some certainty which body of substantive law would be applied 
ex post to Ms Seller’s conduct wherever a claim against her might ultimately be 
brought, and therefore we can determine ex ante which body of substantive law we 
will need to consult to determine the obligations respecting the use of the King image 
that are imposed on her. 
But alas, the law of publicity is not like that.  Determining which body of state 
law applies to possible publicity claims arising out of our seller’s  activities turns out 
to be unusually problematic, because the states disagree quite substantially 
concerning the appropriate choice of law rules to apply to publicity actions.9  You 
 
 8. See Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law and Property, 26 STETSON L. REV. 257, 259 (1996) (“No 
choice-of-law rule has earlier vintage, or greater longevity, than the rule that issues directly pertaining to 
real property are governed by the law of the situs of the property” whereby “the law of the situs governs 
all issues pertaining to realty, including issues generated by the conveyance, encumbrance, or inheritance 
of realty.”). 
 9. Courts faced with the problem of aggregating publicity claims from different states have 
commented on the extreme variation in state choice of law principles applied to these claims.  See Dryer 
v. NFL, No. 09-2182, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156712, at *17–20 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2013) (describing the 
nature of the multi-state choice of law analysis for publicity claims as “exceedingly complex” and 
“extremely complex”).  See also Lightbourne v. Printroom Inc., 307 F.R.D. 593, 600 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(describing inter-state variation in choice of law rules for publicity claims); In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same).  See generally, 
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could do a serviceable survey of the many different approaches that jurisdictions can 
take to choice of law questions limiting yourself entirely to cases involving publicity 
claims.  
To begin with, states do not even agree on whether publicity claims are property 
claims or tort claims, which can dramatically affect the choice of law principles that 
are applied to the claims.10  Some states apply the doctrine of lex locus delicti to the 
tort, applying the substantive law of the state where the tort was committed or to the 
place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged tort took 
place.  Some states look to the law of the place where the injury was suffered rather 
than the place where the act was committed, which will often be the plaintiff’s 
domicile, or where the commercial value of one’s persona is exploited.  Other states 
treat publicity rights as intellectual property rights, and look to the law of the place 
where the property is situated.  Still others follow the guidelines contained in the 
Restatement Second  of Conflict of Law guidelines for the related tort of “invasion 
of privacy.” This analysis requires looking to “the local law of the state where the 
invasion occurred . . . unless . . . some other state has a more significant relationship 
to the occurrence and the parties.”11  Others do an even more complex and 
idiosyncratic interest-balancing.  California, for instance, applies a three-step 
“governmental interest” analysis to these choice of law questions, under which its 
courts apply “the law of the state whose interest would be most impaired if its law 
were not applied.”12  Minnesota’s choice of law analysis involves consideration of 
five factors:  (1) Predictability of result, (2) maintenance of interstate order, (3) 
simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum’s governmental 
interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law.13 
And it gets worse—at least, from an uncertainty perspective.  The choice of law 
rules in many jurisdictions look to the plaintiff’s domicile as the source of governing 
law regarding publicity claims, on the grounds that it is where the purported 
rightsholder would have suffered the injury from the violation.14  But this only serves 
to heighten Ms. Seller’s uncertainty, because ex ante we cannot determine the 
plaintiff’s domicile given that there is as yet no “plaintiff.”  We are, remember, trying 
to help Ms. Seller comply with her legal obligations so as to avoid encountering a 
“plaintiff.”  We may have no idea¾and, more importantly, no practical way to find 
out¾who might be the relevant rightsholder, and where he or she or it is domiciled.   
 
Melinda R. Eades, Note, Choice of Law and the Right of Publicity:  Domicile as An Essential First Step, 
66 BROOK. L. REV. 1301 (2001). 
 10. For an astute distillation of the problems inherent in the property versus tort claim split see 
Dryer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156712, at *16–20.  See also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN,  THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 75–86 (2018) (discussing the property/tort 
distinction in publicity law). 
 11. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 152 (1971).  
 12. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 13. Dryer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156712, at *17.  
 14. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 
1146 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that while many States “apply the law of plaintiff’s domicile for right 
of publicity claims,” it “does not represent a universal rule,” and “[n]ot every jurisdiction follows this 
approach”). 
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This is especially troublesome where, as here, the publicity rights attach to an 
individual who is deceased.  In any lawsuit involving Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
publicity right, the plaintiff will obviously not be Reverend King himself, but 
claimants to whatever rights might have passed under his estate.  These claimants 
might be domiciled (and injured by Ms. Seller’s unlicensed sale) anywhere. 
Determining whose right of publicity law applies to our seller’s sale thus appears 
to be more difficult than in the ordinary case, because the states disagree whose law 
applies to these claims.  So, we face substantial uncertainty at the 
outset¾considerably more, I think, than in the ordinary case.  
 
It is not exactly a roulette wheel, see Figure. 3,15 . . . 
 
. . .  but it is certainly on the roulette-wheel side of the uncertainty spectrum. 
 
That is my first point:  With respect to publicity claims, our fifty-state choice of 
law system is unusually indeterminate as to which state’s law Ms. Seller must look 
to ex ante in order to determine what her legal obligations are. 
This sort of choice of law confusion and uncertainty is interesting, but, standing 
alone, it is not terribly alarming.  Ex ante uncertainty about whether Georgia or New 
York or Oklahoma law is to be applied to our seller’s transaction only really 
matters—to her, and therefore to her lawyer—if and to the extent that the substantive 
law involved also varies substantially across states.  Even if the choice of law system 
 
 15. CHOICE OF LAW WHEEL, https://perma.cc/W2EF-CGSU (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
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for these publicity claims is a chaotic and unpredictable mess and it is virtually 
impossible to determine ex ante which State’s law applies—even if it actually is a 
roulette wheel!—provided the substantive law involved is largely the same across all 
jurisdictions, Ms. Seller’s obligations will be the same or similar wherever the 
roulette wheel stops and whichever law is applied.  If there is little or no variability 
in the relevant substantive law across states, the choice of law uncertainty, however 
extreme it may be, will not significantly hinder our ability to determine her 
obligations ex ante. 
Many bodies of state law operate in this fashion.  Most common law contract 
claims, for instance, are basically the same in Illinois as they are in Colorado due in 
large part to the Uniform Commercial Code, a vast swath of contract law.  There are 
differences at the margin, but in these legal domains, state law is, substantively, 
pretty uniform across the system as a whole.   
But uniformity is not the norm for the right of publicity.  With regard to 
substantive variation among states, the law of publicity is, again, a high-uncertainty 
outlier.  The fifty states’ right of publicity laws vary substantially from one state to 
another, and not just at the margins.  Some states hardly recognize any form of 
publicity action at all; some states treat it as intellectual property; some treat it as a 
form of commercial misappropriation; some treat it as a tortious invasion of privacy.  
How and when the right accrues, to whom it accrues, which aspects of “identity” are 
protected and which are not, whether the right protects only against commercial uses 
of a plaintiff’s or includes non-commercial uses, whether the claimant has to have 
commercially exploited his/her identity during his/her lifetime in order to have a 
claim¾on all of these dimensions the law differs greatly from state to state.  And 
also, of great pertinence to our seller, states do not agree on whether the rights are 
transferable as personal property, and whether they are descendible to one’s heirs.16  
So that is my second point:  Publicity law is unusually indeterminate as a substantive 
matter across jurisdictions.  
My third point is that it is this double indeterminacy¾uncertainty first as to which 
law applies, and uncertainty second as to what that law might say¾that makes 
publicity law so “alarming.”  It looks uncomfortably like spinning a roulette wheel 
in order to determine which one of the fifty differently-configured roulette wheels 
you will be allowed to play.  Predicting the outcome of that process ex ante is no 
trivial matter.  It may not be quite the “perfect storm” of legal uncertainty, but it does 
seem to be a little too close for comfort.   
We do not, sadly, have any good way to measure these kinds of legal uncertainty 
and variability.  If we did, we might be able to construct a graph along the lines of 
 
 16. See Lightbourne v. Printroom Inc., 307 F.R.D. 593, 598–99 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (describing how 
the “states’ right of publicity laws vary significantly”); see generally ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 96–98 
(summarizing the “chaos” and “confusion” in state publicity law).  See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying California law); Cummings v. Soul Train Holdings 
LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 599, 602-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying Illinois law); Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts 
Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (applying Indiana law); Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 
S.E.2d 622 (Ga. 2013) (applying Georgia law); City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 307 
N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1981) (applying North Dakota law). 
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the hypothetical one shown in Figure 4, plotting the location of different state law 
regimes¾trespass law, employment law, contract law, defamation law, publicity 
law, etc.¾along these two uncertainty dimensions.  My guess is that such a graph 
would look something like this: 
 
Figure 4.  Hypothetical Mapping of State Law Regimes Based on Inter-State Jurisdictional and 
Substantive Variability. 
 
Some bodies of law (defamation, perhaps, or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress) would end up in the “northwest” quadrant—high inter-state choice of law 
variability accompanied by relatively low inter-state substantive variability.  Other 
legal domains (assault, perhaps, or trespass) might cluster down near the origin, in 
the “southwest” quadrant, due to their low variability on both dimensions.  Some 
bodies of law (employment law, perhaps, or corporation law) might end up in the 
“southeast” quadrant, with (high inter-state substantive variability but relatively low 
choice of law variability.   
The “northeast” quadrant—bodies of law with high variability on both 
dimensions—is where the trouble lies.  We might imagine a line—what I have called 
the “acceptability frontier”—marking off the area of the graph where a body of law’s 
combined uncertainty regarding both choice of law and substantive law starts to set 
off our Rule of Law alarm bells.  And publicity law may well occupy a space in that 
alarming zone.  
What to make of all this?  It did make me wonder:  Even if I am correct in these 
speculations, and publicity law is indeed an outlier amongst all the other domains of 
state law when viewed in “uncertainty space,” out there across the Acceptability 
Frontier, is there a way to argue that such a system is not merely alarmingly uncertain 
but unconstitutionally uncertain?  That is, if one believes, following Fuller, that the 
ability to determine one’s legal obligations in advance is a fundamental component 
of due process and the Rule of Law, is there not a point at which the fifty-state 
interlocking system of choice of law and substantive rules produces outcomes that 
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are so uncertain—so close to a roulette wheel—that the system as a whole constitutes 
a denial of constitutionally guaranteed due process?17  
Though I would like to think that the Constitution protects against this kind of 
randomness and uncertainty, a little research and thinking on the question persuaded 
me that it does not.  To begin with, there are some pretty difficult procedural 
questions:  How would one even mount a constitutional challenge of this kind?  The 
uncertainty is the product of fifty states acting without coordination; who is the 
defendant in a claim that it is unconstitutional?  What kind of remedy could a court 
provide if it were? 
Furthermore, while the Court has held that there are indeed due process 
constraints on a state’s application of its choice of law rules, those constraints do not 
appear to include protection against this kind of systemic ex ante uncertainty.  In 
order to satisfy due process, state choice of law decisions must be “neither arbitrary 
nor fundamentally unfair.”18  To determine whether this is the case, the Court looks 
to “the contacts of the State whose law is being applied with the parties and with the 
occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation.”19  Where the state lacks any 
“significant contact” with the parties, and the occurrence or transaction at issue, 
application of the state’s law is unconstitutional.  
The requirement that there be some “minimum contact” between the state whose 
law is applied and the parties or the occurrence/transaction that gave rise to the claim 
would presumably invalidate a state’s use of an actual roulette wheel to decide 
applicable law in a publicity case, at least on those occasions where the wheel’s 
pointer landed on a body of law—“Wyoming law, come on down!”—that had no 
connection whatsoever to the parties or the claim. 
While that is comforting, I suppose, it will not alleviate the kind of uncertainty 
Ms. Seller faces.  It will not, for instance, invalidate the use of “plaintiff’s domicile” 
to determine the substantive publicity law to be applied even if plaintiff’s domicile is 
unknowable in advance.  That is, suppose a King heir, domiciled in Indiana, files suit 
against our seller in any state in which “plaintiff’s domicile” is the governing choice 
of law rule for publicity claims.  Even if the existence of a King heir domiciled in 
Indiana was both unknown to Ms. Seller and, as a practical matter, unknowable ex 
ante (without a terrifyingly complicated and expensive search of the public records 
of all fifty states), application of Indiana law to this claim satisfies the Allstate test 
because ex post it turns out that there is a connection between Indiana and the 
parties¾Indiana is, after all, plaintiff’s domicile.  That this fact may have been 
effectively unknowable in advance to Ms. Seller does not—at least as I understand 
Allstate and its progeny—rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  
And perhaps more to the point:  The systemic uncertainty of the publicity rights 
system is, in a very real sense, the byproduct—the inevitable byproduct, one might 
even say—of a federal system under which each of the fifty states can select, for its 
own reasons, priorities and policies, its own choice of law rules and its own 
 
 17. FULLER, supra note 7.  Whether this particular system—the fifty-state system of publicity 
rights—is at, or anywhere near, that point is, of course, an entirely separate question. 
 18. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981). 
 19. Id. at 308. 
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substantive rules governing particular claims.  In a system like that, chaos—
literally—may ensue.  This uncertainty, in other words, is just the price we pay for 
our federal system and state sovereignty, and it will surely not be easy to craft an 
argument that the entirely predictable result of the federal system and state 
sovereignty—both solidly grounded, of course, in the Constitution itself—renders 
the system unconstitutional. 
The truly interesting story here is not the existence of the chaos in publicity law 
but its absence in so many other areas of the law.  In the past eighty years since Erie 
Railroad made these choice of law questions so important in the federal system, the 
system has settled down to produce a substantial degree of predictability and 
certainty.20  Publicity law looks like an outlier, but only, perhaps, because it is so 
relatively new, and has not had enough time to settle down into more predictable and 
manageable patterns.  
So, while the Due Process Clause may not offer Ms. Seller much in the way of 
possible relief, let me end by suggesting that the Constitution may constrain this 
system of publicity rights in another way.  There is another feature of this 
system¾closely related to systemic uncertainty but not entirely coextensive with 
it¾that might well invoke constitutional protections.  Judge Kozinski, in his 
dissenting opinion in the 9th Circuit’s well-known “Vanna White” case, summarized 
it this way: 
[T]he right of publicity isn’t geographically limited.  A right of publicity created by one 
state applies to conduct everywhere, so long as it involves a celebrity domiciled in that 
state.  If a Wyoming resident creates an ad that features a California domiciliary’s 
name or likeness, he [or she] will be subject to California right of publicity law even if 
he’s careful to keep the ad from [ever] being shown in California. . . . The broader and 
more ill-defined one state’s right of publicity, the more it interferes with the legitimate 
interests of other states. . . . Under the majority’s approach, any time anybody in the 
United States¾even somebody who lives in a state with a very narrow right of 
publicity¾creates an ad, he takes the risk that it might remind some segment of the 
public of somebody, perhaps somebody with only a local reputation, somebody the 
advertiser has never heard of.  So you made a commercial in Florida and one of the 
characters reminds Reno residents of their favorite local TV anchor (a California 
domiciliary)?  Pay up.21 
I believe that he is, descriptively speaking, correct; that is indeed how the law of 
publicity often works.  Judge Kozinski’s hypothetical Wyoming resident can be 
violating California publicity law even though his transactions would appear to have 
nothing to do with California.  Similarly, Ms. Seller could be violating Indiana law 
even though her transactions would appear to have nothing to do with Indiana, if¾as 
 
 20. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 63 (1938).  
 21. White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (emphases 
added).  Kozinski¾correctly, in my view¾described the majority opinion in the case, holding that 
Samsung’s use of a cartoon robot “in a wig, gown and jewelry reminiscent of Vanna White’s hair and 
dress . . . posed next to a Wheel-of-Fortune-like game board” infringed White’s publicity rights in her 
“identity,” as “a classic case of overprotection.”  Id. at 1514.  For another provocative dissent in the equally 
overprotective “Cheers” case authored by Judge Kozinski, see Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 
(9th Cir. 1999).  
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is possible¾one of the heirs to the King estate happens to be domiciled there.  That 
is not the only possible outcome in Ms. Seller’s case, to be sure, but it is a perfectly 
plausible one under the system we have.   
And if Indiana law applies to Ms. Seller, a Vermont resident transacting business 
in New York, then presumably it can apply to an Ohio resident conducting business 
in Pennsylvania, a California resident conducting business in Texas, etc.  So, Judge 
Kozinski is correct:  A “right of publicity created by one state”¾Indiana¾“applies 
to conduct everywhere.”  And I think he is correct normatively speaking as well when 
he writes:  “This is an intolerable result, as it gives each state far too much control 
over artists in other states.”22  Of course, “intolerable” does not equate to 
unconstitutional.  But I do think there is an argument that can be constructed here 
that this kind of state regulation, namely Indiana or California reaching outside of its 
borders and imposing its law on conduct by a “foreign” seller taking place entirely 
in another state, may violate the restrictions on “extra-territorial regulation” 
stemming from the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause. 
The idea that States cannot project their laws to control conduct beyond State 
borders¾that the good citizens of Indiana cannot, through their laws, control what a 
Vermont resident does while she is in New York¾has a long, dense, and fascinating 
history of which I can only scratch the surface here.  Up until the early part of the 
twentieth century, it was taken for granted, a kind of truism derived ultimately from 
the inherent territorial limitations on state sovereignty; it does not expressly appear 
in the Constitution, but that is probably because, as Professor Douglas Laycock 
famously put it, it was “so obvious that the Founders neglected to state it.”23  The 
classic formulation was set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877: 
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the 
State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits 
would be deemed, . . . an illegitimate assumption of power . . . [E]very State possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory, 
[and] no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons and property 
without its territory.24 
This doctrine, with its tight linkage between territory and sovereignty, was largely 
discarded during the course of the twentieth century (though it was not until 1977 
that Pennoyer itself was overruled25), and replaced by our more modern, flexible 
notions of sovereignty and jurisdictional competence.   
But the idea that States are prohibited from regulating extraterritorially continues 
to pop up periodically in the law.  Intuitively, there is a common understanding that 
there are some things taking place outside Indiana that Indiana cannot interfere with, 
though courts and commentators have not been able to come up with a formulation 
 
 22. White, 989 F.2d at 1512, 1519. 
 23. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 251 (1992). 
 24. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 
(1977). 
 25. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
POST, TERRITORIALITY, JURISDICTION, AND THE RIGHT(S) OF PUBLICITY, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365 (2019)  
376 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:3 
that crystallizes that understanding or articulates the line between extraterritorial 
regulation that is, and extraterritorial regulation that is not, constitutional.26 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, stated the prohibition on 
state extraterritorial regulation as a virtual per se rule under the dormant Commerce 
Clause: 
 [A] state law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly 
outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause. . . [A] statute that 
directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds 
the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether 
the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.27 
When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or 
when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have 
generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.28 
The Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that 
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has 
effects within the State.29 
The “inherent limits” of state authority—it sounds like Pennoyer v. Neff!  Taken 
literally, these cases would have swept a great deal of law swept aside and tossed it 
in the dustbin.30  Among other things, we would have to jettison much of the choice 
of law edifice that has emerged in the wake of Erie Railroad, which involves 
applying one State law’s onto “commerce that takes place wholly outside of the 
State’s borders” all the time.31 
 
 26. Professor Donald Regan, in his influential 1987 article critiquing the Court’s 
“extraterritoriality” doctrine(s), sets up the following hypothetical: 
Imagine that Michigan decides to prohibit cigarette smoking completely.  It forbids the 
importation, sale, possession, or use of cigarettes in Michigan.  Now, we know that if Michigan 
did this, it would immediately be faced with an enormous problem of smuggling and bootleg 
cigarettes.  To deal with this problem, Michigan would have every incentive to prohibit cigarette 
manufacture in North Carolina, if it could do so.  But it cannot.  The fact that cigarette manufacture 
in North Carolina has bad effects in Michigan (and it will have bad effects even after Michigan 
has banned cigarettes, because of the inevitable smuggling) does not give Michigan even the 
shadow of a justification for prohibiting cigarette manufacture in North Carolina. 
Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays:  (I) Cts Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1899-00 (1987).  
Similarly, he writes:  “If Arizona has a maximum speed limit on its freeways of sixty-five miles per hour, 
Maine should not be allowed to impose on Maine citizens driving through Arizona a speed limit of fifty-
five miles per hour, even if that is the law of Maine.”  Id. at 1908.  Professor Regan demonstrates that 
while it is clear that Michigan and Maine cannot do these things, the reason why they cannot do these 
things is much less clear.  Articulating the principle¾of territoriality, or sovereignty, or federalism, or 
some combination thereof¾that explains the matter is a difficult task indeed.  
 27. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332, 336 (1989).  
 28. Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). 
 29. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982)  
 30. As Professor Regan succinctly put it:  “It is clear that the Court cannot flatly prohibit all state 
laws that have extraterritorial effects, or even all state laws that have substantial extraterritorial effects.  
Such a prohibition would invalidate much too much legislation.”  See Regan, supra note 26, at 1878. 
 31. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.  
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Sometimes the Court means to sweep aside and to lay waste to entire systems of 
law and toss them in the dustbin.  Erie Railroad itself is one of the better examples 
of that.  But that was not the case here.  The ensuing years have not been kind to the 
idea that extra-territorial application of state law is invalid per se under the 
Commerce Clause.  As then-Judge Neil Gorsuch put it, extra-territoriality has 
become “the most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.”32  
But the Commerce Clause does retain some power in the extraterritorial context, 
and some forms of extraterritorial regulation remain constitutionally suspect.  One 
principle that I think is still alive:  The idea that no one single state can create a 
nationwide standard for conduct, a legal regime with nationwide effect.  That is for 
Congress alone to do.  In practical effect, though, that is what often happens under 
the publicity system.  It is precisely what Judge Kozinski was concerned about:  “A 
right of publicity created by one state applies to conduct everywhere, so long as it 
involves a celebrity”¾or, in the case of deceased celebrities, an heir to the publicity 
rights¾“domiciled in that state.”  If there is an Indiana-domiciled heir to Dr. King’s 
publicity rights, Indiana law may be applied to conduct taking place 
anywhere¾including in those states (like, in our seller’s case, New York and 
Vermont) whose law would not support a claim on these facts.  It is my guess that 
one could construct a reasonably strong argument that this extends Indiana’s 
jurisdictional competence beyond the lines that are compatible with the Commerce 
Clause.  The scope and shape of such an argument are, however, beyond the confines 
of this piece.   
 
 32. Energy & Env't Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir 2015).  The scholarly 
literature on the extraterritoriality strand of dormant commerce clause doctrine is quite vast.  See, e.g., 
Chad DeVeaux, One Toke Too Far:  The Demise of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s Extraterritoriality 
Doctrine Threatens the Marijuana Legalization Experiment, 58 B.C. L. REV. 953 (2017); Susan Martin, 
The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497 
(2016); Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause:  A Doctrinal Post-
Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979 (2013); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: 
Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1057 (2009); Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided Revival of 
Strict Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 115 (2003). 
